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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Both the Commission’s proposal for a ‘Competitiveness and Convergence
Instrument’ and the ‘contractual arrangement’ presented by President Van
Rompuy share a common concept: associating EU money with national
structural reforms under a binding arrangement.
The targeted ‘structural reforms’ are the labour market reforms and prod-
uct and services market reforms in eurozone ‘peripheral’ countries facing
the most severe external imbalances. Their implementation would speed up
and facilitate the ‘internal devaluation’ process of these countries. In the
worst case scenario, failure to adopt the necessary reforms and to adjust
wages and prices downwards may lead the most vulnerable countries to
leave the eurozone under social and political pressure. Contracts seek to
reduce this risk by increasing compliance with the country-specific recom-
mendations for structural reforms issued by the EU institutions within the
European Semester, and in particular with the Macroeconomic Imbalance
Procedure (MIP).
As for the financial support, it follows two different, albeit overlapping
rationales. First, the perspective of obtaining EU funding would incentivize
the governments of vulnerable countries to adopt reforms that would bear
a high political and social cost in the short term. That is, without some form
of incentive, it is unlikely that the necessary reforms would be undertaken
and this could have significant negative consequences for the EMU as a
whole. The second rationale amounts to outright solidarity: EU support is
needed to cushion the inevitable socio-economic costs implied not only by
the structural reform, but also by the internal devaluation taking place.
To make sense of contractual arrangements, some points should be consid-
ered in future discussions:
1. Contracts on a voluntary basis only: Contracts cannot be mandatory
unlike initially suggested in the Van Rompuy report. This stems not only
from the inherent definition of a ‘contract’ – where mutual consent is key –
but also from the non-binding nature of the preventive arm of the MIP.
Making the country-specific recommendations issued by the EU institu-
tions systematically binding would imply transfers of sovereignty from the
national to the EU level that go well beyond the present discussion. Instead,
contracts would introduce the possibility of making the preventive arm
binding for some countries where corrections are most needed and urgent
for the EMU as a whole.MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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2. Better prioritization by the Commission of Country Specific Recommen-
dations is required: Because available financial resources will remain lim-
ited 
and because contracts should address the lack of reforms where it is most
important and urgent, the Commission will have to justify which reforms
are the most important across eurozone countries. In practice, it should
suggest (i) for which CSR a country may enter into a contractual arrange-
ment, (ii) the size of the financial support that would be made available and
(iii) a deadline for proposing a reform agenda.
3. Financial support is mostly needed on solidarity grounds: Some money
is needed to incentivize a country to voluntarily engage into a contract.
However, overtly justifying it as an incentive would raise much criticism:
that no incentive is actually needed, that the sanctioning mechanism fore-
seen in the Excessive Imbalance Procedure should instead be used and that
the Commission would basically be buying off the country’s sovereignty to
put it under enhanced surveillance. Instead, it should be clear from the
onset that the financial support essentially amounts to a conditional soli-
darity mechanism. This will allow (mostly creditor) countries to cushion
some of the unavoidable costs incurred by (debtor) countries undergoing an
internal devaluation process. Moral hazard would not be a relevant issue in
the discussion on contracts, as financial support is conditional on compli-
ance with the reform agenda which must speed up, not slow down, the
adjustment process.
4. Countries under a financial assistance programme should be able to ben-
efit: Because solidarity would be central, there is no a priori reason why
Greece, Ireland, Portugal or Cyprus should be excluded from financial sup-
port because they have refinancing difficulties – quite the opposite. The
money could back some specific reforms being undertaken as part of their
adjustment programme, providing EU solidarity in the form of grants next
to the loans from the EFSF/ESM.
5. Appropriate funding is required: Total committed funding required over
5 years could vary between €30bn and €75bn (assuming that (i) the net
transfers towards beneficiaries will range between 0.2% and 0.5% of their
respective GDP (ii) and that the potential contracting countries are those in
the eurozone ‘periphery’). Recognizing the financing needs from the start
would prevent wasting energy and time on discussing what would other-
wise be ineffective contracts.MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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6. Contracting countries should benefit from ESM precautionary credit
lines: when entering contractual arrangement, (non-programme) countries
should systematically be granted a precautionary credit line from the ESM.
Under the ECB’s ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ programme, this would
allow the ECB to act as a genuine lender of last resort and shelter the adjust-
ing country from any adverse events in sovereign bond markets.
7. Legitimacy of the EU Semester will remain limited: well-designed con-
tracts may entice broader support of the reforms by National Parliaments.
However, contracts would not as such create greater involvement of the
European Parliament, beyond the current ‘Economic Dialogue’. The legiti-
macy issue of the EU Semester as such will thus not be addressed by con-
tracts.
Agreeing on introducing contracts will not be easy. Eurozone countries
would be required to commit sufficient funding (a one-off commitment
likely ranging from 0.1 to 0.2% of their GDP) – possibly an unpalatable
prospect in a period of fiscal consolidation. However, targeted and tempo-
rary transfers can be very effective in rapidly prompting and supporting
structural reforms in most vulnerable countries. This would facilitate their
effective adjustment, a precondition for cross-border financial flows to
resume, and ultimately for restoring growth and creating jobs. Contracts
would also introduce a solidarity mechanism which would convey an
important signal that countries sharing the euro are committed to preserv-
ing their union.
However, contracts would not lead to a definitive crisis resolution on their
own. Restoring normal lending conditions and reversing financial fragmen-
tation in the eurozone for capital to flow ‘downhill’ again from creditor to
debtor countrie would have a larger impact than any form of fiscal transfers
within the eurozone. Further steps towards an effective and genuine bank-
ing union should complement any initiatives on contracts.9
INTRODUCTION
Both the ‘contractual arrangements’ presented in the European Council Presi-
dent Van Rompuy report ‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’
(Van Rompuy, 2012) and the ‘Convergence and Competitiveness Instruments’
(CCI) in the Commission’s blueprint (European Commission, 2012) constitute
early proposals on the concept of ‘contracts’. A contract would bind the con-
tracting Member State to the EU in adopting the structural reforms most needed
for the functioning of the EMU. EU financial support would in turn be granted
to the contracting Member State. This kind of arrangement is presented as a first
step towards a deeper economic union, aimed at addressing some of the EMU
weaknesses revealed by the crisis.
At the December 2012 Council, EU leaders tasked Herman van Rompuy and the
Commission with exploring this idea further by June 2013, distinguishing
between the ‘mutually agreed arrangement of a contractual nature’ and the ‘sol-
idarity mechanisms for the countries entering into such arrangements’ (Euro-
pean Council, 2012). In a subsequent communication to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council, the Commission presented options and questions to elicit
input from stakeholders (European Commission, 2013). The matter should fur-
ther be explored during the June 2013 Council meeting.
In this paper, I will begin by reviewing the core features of the two early propos-
als on ‘contracts’: the CCI and ‘contractual arrangement’ (part 1). I will then
aim to clarify the content of these ‘contracts,’ which is twofold: on the one hand,
the structural reforms that the contracting Member State would commit to
implement (part 2), and on the other hand, the financial support that the EU
would grant to the contracting Member State (part 3). I will in particular under-
line their respective rationale. Finally, I will highlight what kind of contracts
would make sense by making preliminary conclusions on their possible design
(part 4). Following these recommendations I will briefly highlight what the pro-
cedure for contractual arrangements may look like (part 5).
Xavier VANDEN BOSCH
Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Egmont 11
1. EARLY PROPOSALS FOR ‘CONTRACTS’
The main features of both proposals are summarized here: the ‘contractual
arrangements’ as they appear in the Van Rompuy report ‘Towards a genuine
Economic and Monetary Union’ (1.1) and the Commission’s ‘Convergence and
Competitiveness Instruments’ (1.2). Annex I provides some useful background
information on how EU economic policy guidance is articulated with the Euro-
pean Semester, and in particular with the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure.
Annex II provides a detailed comparison of the core features of both proposals.
1.1. ‘Contractual arrangements’ in the Van Rompuy 
report
Under the report by the European Council President (Van Rompuy, 2012), con-
tractual arrangements would be mandatory for all eurozone countries, but vol-
untary for other Member States. For countries under the corrective arm of the
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), the contract would be the Correc-
tive Action Plan (CAP) (as defined in regulation 1176/2011).
The proposal stresses the need to detect and correct macroeconomic imbalances
by addressing the structural rigidities in the labour markets and product and
services markets whose efficiency is required for the well-functioning of the
EMU in the absence of exchange rate adjustment. Dialogue with Member States
would be increased in order for the Commission to produce in-depth reviews
that would be generalized to all EMU countries. Based on their conclusions, the
Commission would then recommend the Council to adopt its Country Specific
Recommendations (CSRs) by the end of the EU semester. The CSRs would in
turn serve as the basis for ‘further dialogue on the specific and detailed measures
contained in the reform arrangements (i.e. the contracts), including a timeframe
for implementation’. The agreement would most likely be of a multiannual
nature.
To further ensure national ownership of the reforms, the agreement of National
Parliaments would be a requirement. The Commission would inform the Euro-
pean and National Parliaments of the necessity of these measures from an EMU
perspective. Accountability would be ensured by effective monitoring of the spe-
cific, detailed and measureable reform agenda. Contracting governments would
be held accountable by their own Parliament, while the Commission would
answer to the European Parliament.
The report also suggests that the structural reforms agreed in the contract could
be supported ‘on a case-by-case basis’ by ‘temporary, limited, targeted and flex-
ible financial support depending on the specific situation of each country’. Spe-MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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cific resources, treated separately from the multiannual financial framework,
would be necessary to finance this support.
1.2. The Commission’s ‘Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instruments’
Convergence and Competitiveness Instruments (CCI) put forward in the Com-
mission’s Blueprint are more detailed than the ‘contractual arrangements’ in the
Van Rompuy report while being conceptually very close to them. An important
difference is that the CCI bundles together both the contractual arrangement
and financial support, thus making the latter an inherent part of the former,
rather than presenting it as merely optional.
The Commission’s series of ‘Staff Working Documents’, which assess the
National Reform Programme and Stability Programmes submitted by the Mem-
ber States, would be published earlier to enable a better dialogue on the analysis.
Then, the actual coordination of structural policies would start with the publi-
cation of a ‘horizontal appraisal of the proposed major economic reforms’. The
conclusions of this horizontal document would be discussed in the Eurogroup
and the ECOFIN Council in view of ‘systematically coordinating ex ante the
major reform plans’. This new step in the EU Semester would be based on Arti-
cle 11 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance.
In turn, the Commission would come forward with a proposal for CSRs that
would be ‘more detailed, policy-specific and time bound’. The idea of the Com-
mission is that the improved conditions of the dialogue leading to the CSRs and
their greater focus and specificity ‘could give a greater impetus to reform efforts
in Member States’. Based on the CSRs, countries under the preventive arm of the
MIP could voluntarily submit a contractual arrangement proposal, including
specific policy actions they intend to implement, as well as a timetable for those
actions. For countries with excessive imbalances under the corrective arm of the
MIP i.e. countries under the Excessive Imbalance Procedure, the contract would
be mandatory as it would correspond to the Corrective Action Plan (as provided
for by regulation 1176/2011). Countries voluntarily submitting a contract
would follow similar procedures and deadlines as under the corrective arm,
except that sanctions would not apply (Art 8 to 12 of regulation 1176/2011).
Financial support would consist in a lump sum to be attributed per contractual
arrangements, ‘not earmarked to specific reforms’. However, disbursement
would be conditional upon the measures/reforms agreed being implemented.
The instrument would be financed based on a contribution key dependent on
GNI via external assigned revenues to the EU budget (thereby avoiding the ceil-
ing on the Multiannual Financial Framework).13
2. STRUCTURAL REFORMS: WHAT IS AT STAKE?
The concept of ‘structural reforms’ is vague enough to potentially refer to an
endless amount of policies. But reforms are always means to an end. In the con-
text of the eurozone crisis, reforms have a specific purpose and meaning. Their
underlying objective is the correction of external imbalances of several eurozone
countries (2.1). To reach this objective, structural reforms mostly seek to liber-
alize labour markets, as well as product and service markets (2.2). The rationale
exposed here largely underlies the Commission and Van Rompuy proposals for
contractual arrangement highlighted in the previous section.
2.1. The need for internal devaluations to correct 
external imbalances
The build-up of external imbalances
In the run-up to the crisis, several countries of the eurozone ‘periphery’ (Greece,
Portugal, Ireland, Spain) had large current accounts deficits which deteriorated
their net international investment position (NIIP) – i.e. the stock of liabilities vis-
à-vis the rest of the world. However, these external imbalances were not consid-
ered to be an issue but rather the result of a successful European financial inte-
gration. The relation between domestic savings and investment was thought to
have become irrelevant as countries could rely on international financial mar-
kets to finance their current account imbalance. Capital flows from the core of
the eurozone to the ‘periphery’ would develop the higher growth potential of the
‘periphery’, channeling excess northern Europe savings into investments offer-
ing better return prospects.
With hindsight, too much faith was put into the effectiveness of international
allocation of capital and in the sustainability of economic convergence within
the eurozone. Private financial flows from the core to the periphery, instead of
leading to sustainable domestic growth and productivity gains, notably pro-
moted the emergence of bubbles in the real-estate and construction sector (Spain
and Ireland) and excessive consumption (Greece and Portugal). All in all, exter-
nal financing dynamics fueled current account deficits rather than the trade per-
formance (Gros 2012; Holinski et al 2012).
The reasons invoked for such unsustainable developments are multiple. The
convergence of interest rates following the introduction of the euro had been
promoted by financial regulation and the ECB policy which both assumed all
eurozone countries were equally safe. With low converging interest rates, the
common monetary policy was too accommodating to the south, which dis-
played higher inflation rates. This translated into lower real interest rates in theMONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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periphery which favored investment and consumption, hence further inflation.
The credit boom was further fueled not only by specific features of local credit
market, but also by a general context of ample liquidity availability feeding a
high risk appetite throughout global financial markets (Gros, 2012).
With growth perspective deteriorating as the financial and eurozone sovereign
debt crises were unfolding, risks were being radically reassessed. What followed
was a ‘sudden stop’ – a sudden reversal of private financing of the large current
account deficits in the eurozone periphery (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012). As
private funding receded, and both the public and private sector faced important
refinancing constraints, alternative sources of financing partly replaced external
private funding. Official flows acted as a buffer to the withdrawal of private
flows: the liquidity provided by the ECB (as witnessed by the TARGET liabilities
increase) and official loans provided to programme countries (bilateral/EFSM/
EFSF/ESM/IMF loans).
The internal devaluation process
But in essence, these buffers only temporarily cushion the need for deficit coun-
tries to rebalance their external indebtedness. As private external financing has
largely receded, deficit countries are now constrained to reduce their current
accounts deficits to a level deemed sustainable (which may be defined as the
level that stabilizes the country’s net international investment position) (Buti and
Turrini, 2012).
While adjusting, countries still service their accumulated foreign liabilities (they
have a negative income balance), and this further depresses their current account
and fuels their negative NIIP. Such servicing of external liabilities makes up
about two-thirds of the current account imbalances of Greece, Spain, Portugal
and Ireland (on average since the introduction of the euro – Holinski et al,
2012). As a consequence, these countries borrow on average the equivalent of
about 5% of GDP from the rest of the world only to service their debt.
Hence, to break the vicious circle and stabilize their external position, a positive
net trade balance is required, which can be attained by reducing imports and/or
increasing exports. Decreasing imports implies an inevitable drop in domestic
demand which means a lower GDP. An export-led recovery is thus largely advo-
cated – or hoped for – as it would not imply the same pain.
How can such an export-led rebalancing occur? Stuck with a euro that is too
expensive and the need to reduce imbalances, the country must necessarily
increase its competitiveness, which is largely considered in its cost and price
dimension. This implies relative deflation (disinflation) in the deficit countries
compared to their main trading partners – the creditor countries in the euro-MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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zone’s core (Blanchard, 2007; Krugman, 2011; Buti and Turrini, 2012; Sinn,
2012). A decrease of relative wages, an increase in productivity and finally a
relative decrease in price would allow the deficit countries to restore their com-
petitiveness and attractiveness. And this would ultimately restore growth and
create jobs.
Such an ‘internal devaluation’ substitutes for a possible ‘external devaluation’
made impossible since deficit countries have relinquished their own currency in
favour of the euro. According to some estimates, prices in Spain, Greece and
Portugal would need to be reduced by 25% to 35% compared to the eurozone
average (Goldman Sachs, 2013). If the actual effort is difficult to measure, an
internal devaluation is generally assumed to be long and painful. The principle
is the following for the most affected countries: in the years following the intro-
duction of the euro, convergence with northern countries was actually excessive
as it was unsustainably fueled by credit booms; wages rose beyond what pro-
ductivity would suggest and prices increased above the EU average. These coun-
tries therefore need to ‘rewind the clock’ to realign wages and prices to a sus-
tainable equilibrium: years of excessive convergence must be followed by years
of divergence, until southern countries become ‘cheap’ again relative to the core
of the eurozone (CESifo, 2012).
2.2. The role of structural reforms in the devaluation 
process
Structural reforms mostly encompass two categories of supply-side reforms: (i)
labour market reforms and (ii) product and service market reforms. Labour
market reforms are generally considered to be the most important in the deval-
uation process. Structural reforms can facilitate the correction of excessive
external imbalances and also help absorb future asymmetric shocks (Buti and
Turrini, 2012). The correction of the pre-existing imbalances is arguably what
matters the most in the debate on contractual arrangements. Contracts would
thus address immediate and important imbalances and be ‘corrective’ before
being ‘preventive’.
Labour market reforms
There is a widely-accepted fact in the history of economic theory on ‘downward
wage stickiness’: while wages easily move upwards, they tend not to adjust
downwards in a downturn (Leidler, 1992; Bewley, 1999). Labour market
reforms seek to remove the (legal) factors leading to such wage stickiness, which
prevents the downward adjustment of wages. More flexible labour marketsMONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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would allow for lower wages which in turn would allow for lower prices,
thereby making the economy more competitive.
Failing to remove labour market rigidities would induce a pattern of adjustment
to shocks that falls disproportionately on employment, reduce growth and make
the adjustment more painful, particularly because the highest cost caused by this
delay is borne by the most vulnerable members of society (Praet, 2013; Coeuré,
2013).
Measures adopted in several deficit countries – notably those under a troika-led
adjustment programme (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) – provide some concrete
examples of labour reforms seeking to introduce more flexibility in the wage-
formation system (Buti and Turrini, 2012). The decentralization of wage bar-
gaining at the firm level by reforming the mechanisms for collective agreements
is favoured (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy). Other reforms typically seek to
diminish the legal minimum wage (Greece) or how minimum wage is set
(Greece, Ireland), to introduce measures favouring the renegotiation of collec-
tive clause (Greece, Portugal, Spain), in order to increase the flexibility of work-
ing-time arrangements (Greece, Portugal).
Product and service markets reforms
Other reforms aim to improve the country’s competitiveness by increasing com-
petition in some product and services markets. Product market reforms seeking
to reduce excessive profit margins in monopolistic sectors sheltered by internal
competition would also allow wage decline to translate into lower relative prices
(Coeuré, 2013). These reforms have large scope and involve the deregulation of
some professions, the promotion of a better business environment and the liber-
alization (including privatization) of some sectors.
In turn, better functioning markets would increase the country’s overall compet-
itiveness by lowering the costs of products and services used by exporting indus-
tries. Productivity would also increase indirectly as firms would become more
efficient by being exposed to increased competition. Reforms seeking to improve
the business environment can been seen as complementary as they promote
entrepreneurship as well as investments from abroad.17
3. FINANCIAL SUPPORT
The possible justifications for granting financial support to a country as part of
the contractual arrangement will first be discussed (3.1), before considering the
total funding for the instrument that would be required (3.2).
3.1. Incentive and solidarity rationale
The rationale of linking a financial incentive to the contract is twofold: the
financial support represents a (positive) financial incentive for reform but also
amounts to a solidarity mechanism. The need for a financial incentive relies on
political economy considerations. Countries with a large external deficit might
not be sufficiently willing to introduce the necessary reforms for adjustment.
There would be a short term political and economic cost linked to these unpop-
ular reforms. Political inaction in vulnerable countries would as a result impose
a negative externality (‘spillover’) to the whole EMU. Negative spillovers could
relate to financial contagion, notably in sovereign debt markets. But ultimately,
negative spillover could be understood as the demise of the eurozone: as the
insufficiently reforming country would fail to adjust, social and political forces
would push for an exit from the euro. A contractual arrangement, by introduc-
ing a positive financial incentive would compensate for the short term economic
and political cost and prompt the country to reform. The incentive would make
the country ‘internalize’ this ‘external cost’.
The second rationale is that financial support amounts to outright solidarity
justified by the social and economic costs faced by the adjusting country. Finan-
cial transfers would help cushion the impact of the reforms, and more generally
of the internal devaluation process. The contract thus opens the perspective of
outright transfers within the eurozone, conditional on reforms. This form of
solidarity differs from the existing solidarity via the EFSF/ESM where loans
rather than grants are provided to vulnerable countries. One could hence imag-
ine that a country would implement the reforms recommended by the EU insti-
tutions without the need for any incentive, but that creditor countries would
nevertheless deem it necessary to alleviate their social and political impact.
All in all, both the incentive and solidarity reasoning point out to the very same
economic and social costs inherent to any internal devaluation process. With
this support, the adjustment would be speeded up and some of the short term
pain lifted. Money would serve both as an incentive (ex-ante) making sure the
country introduces these reforms with no further delay, and as a solidarity mech-
anism (ex-post), cushioning the political and social cost of the reforms and of
the devaluation the reforms aim to facilitate. In the worst-case scenario, this
would prevent the country from having to exit the eurozone.MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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3.2. How much money is needed?
Financial support would back the structural reforms and be conditional upon
them. As mentioned above (see 1.2), the Commission suggested that the finan-
cial mechanism should provide quick, targeted, and limited in time support
which would be financed via external assigned revenues to the EU budget.
Money would be made available as a lump sum per contract. In practice though,
it could as well be spent on specific spending items specified in the contract, like
the financing of active labour market policies or of training programmes.
The funding question first comes down to the question of the potential benefi-
ciaries: which countries should be able to engage into a contractual arrangement
from an economic point of view? The number and size of the economies requir-
ing support is indeed an important factor determining the size of the fund/finan-
cial instrument to set up. Eligible countries should in principle be those facing
the greatest adjustment needs i.e. displaying the greatest imbalances, notably
Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Cyprus.
The next question is how large should the available sum of money be for each
of the affected countries most likely to benefit. A possible point of reference is
the size of the transfers induced by more ambitious macroeconomic schemes.
Such schemes have notably been proposed by EU institutions as a key element
of a deeper budgetary union, notably the ‘shock absorption function’ (Van
Rompuy, 2012) and the ‘stabilisation function’ (European Commission, 2012).
The basic principle is that eurozone countries facing country-specific shock
would benefit from automatic transfers from the common instrument. This
would provide an insurance system whereby risks are pooled across Member
States. Should the financial solidarity involved in the contracts try to even out
the size of the transfers allowed by these macroeconomic schemes, an average
southern country (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) should be able to perceive
about 1% of GDP per year1. For this group of countries, this would require an
annual funding budget of about €30bn.
Although this gives some indication, it is however clear that solidarity levels
introduced by contracts will not match the solidarity involved in these larger
solidarity mechanisms. A cap on the net maximum amount a country should
receive per year would probably lie in the range of 0.2-0.5% of GDP: large
enough to be a meaningful incentive but not as much as in a scheme requiring a
genuine fiscal capacity. The upper range (0.5%) would still represent less than
what Portugal, Greece or Cyprus perceive from cohesion policy funds; the lower
1. Based on transfers implied on average over 2009-2014 in schemes suggested by Pisani-Ferry et al
(2012) where transfers represent 0.25% of the absolute output gap above a 2% threshold and Enderlein
et al (2012) where transfers represents 0.5% of relative deviations of output gap relative to the euro-area
output gap. See Annex III for data.MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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range (0.2%) less than what any likely beneficiaries perceive from cohesion pol-
icy funds2.
Assuming Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Cyprus would be benefici-
aries of a 5-year funding programme, the approximated total funding required
would range between about €30bn and €75bn, for net transfers respectively
amounting to 0.2% and 0.5% of the beneficiary’s GDP (Table 1). This would
require a yearly gross contribution of respectively 0.09% and 0.21% of GDP by
each eurozone country. Not including the programme countries (Greece, Portu-
gal, Ireland and Cyprus), on the sole ground that they have already signed a
‘contract’ under the form of a Memorandum of Understanding, does makes lit-
tle difference as they are small compared with the much larger Spanish and Ital-
ian economies.
Source: Own calculations based 2012 GDP figures (in Commission’s AMECO database)
2. EU Cohesion policy funding committed under the 2007-2013 Multiannual Financial Framework, per
year, as % of respective 2007 GDP: 1.79% (Portugal), 1.63% (Slovenia),1.26% (Greece), 0.53%
(Cyprus), 0.47% (Spain), 0.26% (Italy), source: Marzinotto (2011).
Table 1: Net transfers per year and over 5 years based on cap set at 0.2% or 0.5% of 
GDP (selected countries) (€ billions)
Cap at 0.2% GDP Cap at 0.5% GDP
Potential beneficiaries Yearly net 
transfers
Total over 5 
years 
Yearly net 
transfers 
Total over 5 
years 
Spain 2.1 10.3 5.1 25.7
Italy 3.1 15.5 7.8 38.9
Greece 0.4 1.9 0.9 4.7
Portugal 0.3 1.6 0.8 4.0
Ireland 0.3 1.3 0.6 3.2
Cyprus 0.03 0.2 0.1 0.4
Total 6.2 30.8 15.4 76.921
4. MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL 
ARRANGEMENTS
At this stage of the discussions, there are many possible designs for contractual
arrangements. Each of the following subsections presents recommendations and
considerations for sensible contractual arrangements.
4.1. Contracts on a voluntary basis only
Mutual consent is by definition inherent to a contractual arrangement.
Although the ‘contracts’ were initially envisaged as being ‘mandatory’ (for all
eurozone countries) in the Van Rompuy report and the December 2012 Council
conclusions, these concepts are simply incompatible. There is no such thing as a
‘mandatory contract’3.
Should this be dismissed as a mere wording issue, in which case ‘contractual
arrangements’ would actually mean ‘binding arrangements within the preven-
tive arm of the MIP’, such arrangements would still alter the original design of
the MIP. Current EU recommendations for structural reforms are not ‘binding’
in so far that no enforcement mechanism exists in the preventive arm of the MIP.
Only in the corrective arm of the MIP do countries have to adopt a Corrective
Action Plan and face the prospect of sanctions (see annex I for background
information on the MIP).
With ‘mandatory’ contractual arrangement, recommendations would become
binding for countries under the preventive arm of the MIP. This could concern
all eurozone countries (as in the Van Rompuy proposal) or perhaps just those
facing ‘non-excessive’ macroeconomic imbalances, i.e. the eurozone countries
for which an in-depth review was conducted based on the Alert Mechanism
Report. In the latter scenario, the Council recommendations for all eurozone
countries displaying macroeconomic imbalances would therefore become bind-
ing. Applied to the 2013 EU Semester, they would concern Belgium, Spain,
France, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Finland and Slovenia. The Council’s pre-
viously non-binding ‘recommendations’ would almost become ‘prescriptions’ as
the concerned countries would be forced to address them by signing a contract.
Making the MIP preventive arm binding would go far beyond the original scope
of contractual arrangement – offering money for reforms – and would imply
larger sovereignty transfers from the national to the EU level. Consequently, the
3. This apparent contradiction inevitably led to diverging political statements. The French President,
François Hollande, asserted that contracts “can only be done on a voluntary basis” (Hollande 2012),
while the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, said that “we have not yet clarified the conditions under
which the contract is mandatory or not” (Merkel, 2012).MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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line adopted by the Commission where contracts are only mandatory for coun-
tries under the corrective arm of the MIP is sensible. This means that the preven-
tive arm of the MIP would not become more constraining, but only integrate the
possibility of financial support for countries choosing to abide by the EU recom-
mendations and to commit to reform. Since, ‘contracts’ under the form of the
CAP are already mandatory for countries under the corrective arm of the MIP,
the only modification of the corrective arm would be the availability of financial
support.
4.2. Prioritizing in Country-Specific Recommendations 
is required to determine potential beneficiaries
By design, contracts seek to address the lack of economic reforms in countries
where it is the most urgent and necessary for the well-functioning of the EMU.
However, under their current form, CSRs lack justification and prioritisation,
and tend to follow in some cases a bureaucratic necessity rather than a genuine
need for EU guidance on policies (Hallerberg et al, 2012). The Commission pro-
posal to draft CSRs with ‘greater focus and specificity’, and with a timetable for
specific policy actions, aims to address this issue. At the same time, it should
refrain from being too prescriptive as legitimacy concerns would dictate leaving
most of the initiative to the concerned Member States.
The Commission should explain and justify better why and how specific reforms
included in their recommendations are necessary for the EMU as a whole, and
not just for the country itself. In its proposal for Council recommendations, the
Commission would prioritize recommendations for reforms across countries to
make clear which reforms are the most necessary and urgent in the eurozone.
This would also be a first step towards overcoming economic and political
trade-offs of different reforms (Hallerberg et al, 2011). The ex-ante discussion
and coordination of major reform plans, as envisaged in Article 11 of the TSCG,
may serve to highlight where the lack of reforms pose a problem to the EMU4.
Better prioritization of the CSRs would in turn allow for a pre-selection of the
countries that may engage in a contractual arrangement. If all countries can sub-
mit a contract, the financial support will lack focus and efficiency. This would
clearly be an unacceptable proposition as available funding will be fairly limited.
Instead the Commission should invite those countries where imbalances are the
most severe to draft and propose the reforms in a contractual arrangement.
4. This is as envisaged by the Commission (2012) (see 1.2). It should however be noted that the ex-ante
discussion and coordination of major reform plans, as envisaged in Article 11 of the TSCG, in principle
concern envisaged national reforms plans and not the lack thereof. This further suggests the Commission
should not be overly prescriptive but rather highlight how the lack of reforms impacts the EMU as a
whole.MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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In other words, the Commission would highlight the recommendations for
which a contractual arrangement is sought. At this stage, it should probably
propose the lump sum that would be made available to support reforms asa
clear incentive for the concerned countries. Following the Council’s adoption of
CSR, ‘invited’ countries would then voluntarily prepare a contract during their
National semester.
4.3. Financial support required for incentive AND 
solidarity reasons
Financial support should systematically be made available to countries engag-
ing into a contract. This directly follows from the fact that contracts should be
made on a voluntary basis (see 4.1), and therefore require a form of incentive.
With no perspective for a solidarity funding mechanism, it seems very unlikely
that a country would voluntarily submit itself to the contract’s binding nature
in the preventive arm of the MIP. However, the financial support should not be
presented  strictly as a financial incentive: it is also required on solidarity
grounds.
If presented strictly as an incentive, creditor countries would wonder whether
the countries with imbalances are actually not facing enough incentives for
adopting the reforms. Even if the Commission underlines that the reforms are
not only necessary for the country itself but also for all its partners (the EMU),
benefits will systematically overlap. Hence, the perception might be that coun-
tries would implement the reforms even without the additional financial incen-
tive. In an economic perspective, this would present a ‘deadweight loss’: sup-
porting financially reforms that would have been implemented anyway. Moreo-
ver, competitiveness is a relative concept and some countries may feel more
directly exposed. In practice and for example, a country like France may be
asked to pay for the reforms whose core purpose is to increase the cost compet-
itiveness of Spanish firms.
It could also be argued that the readily available incentive structure of the MIP
should be fully exploited. Instead of designing a new ‘positive’ incentive, the
‘negative’ financial incentive available under the corrective arm of the MIP i.e.
sanctions under the form of an interest-bearing deposit and fine should be used
(Art 3 of regulation 1174/2011). In other words, rather than creating a ‘carrot’,
the existing ‘stick’ could be used. The Commission would therefore need to rec-
ommend the Council to open the Excessive Imbalance Procedure. This would
oblige the country facing excessive imbalances to adopt a Corrective Action
Plan, and to face the possibility of sanctions should it fail to sufficiently them
take into considerations. In short, the Commission may decide to use its fullMONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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powers, which it has refrained from doing so far5. Making the EU funding of
cohesion policy conditional upon addressing CSRs will also reinforce the bind-
ing nature of the recommendations (Verhelst, 2012).
Finally, by overly focusing on its incentive aspect, the money involved could
ultimately be perceived as a side payment from creditor countries to entice vul-
nerable countries to submit themselves to binding arrangements and surveil-
lance by the Commission. It is difficult to see how national endorsement of
reforms will increase if the government appears to be selling off to Brussels and
Berlin.
Financial support is probably more justifiable on solidarity grounds. Countries
face major social costs in their devaluation process. Reforms are intended to
speed up the adjustment, bringing forward most of the costs, in order to reap
benefits in the medium term. Solidarity under the form of outright transfer can
cushion the process, offering some relief. Contracts would convey a strong sig-
nal that solidarity – under the form of conditional grants rather than conditional
loans – from creditor to debtor countries is possible in the eurozone.
Moral hazard arguments that were systematically raised as insurance mecha-
nism proposals were made in the course of the crisis (in particular ‘Eurobonds’
proposals) would not hold in the case of contracts. Financial support imbedded
in the contract would – by definition – be conditional upon the implementation
of structural reforms. The contract rationale is to speed up, not slow down the
adjustment process.
4.4. Countries under a financial assistance programme 
should be able to benefit from the new solidarity 
mechanism
Since the Commission is presenting contracts mostly on the ‘incentive’ ground,
it also suggests that contracts should not concern the ‘programme countries’
(currently: Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus) (Commission, 2012). As they
are already under a ‘contract’ in the shape of a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) and Financial Assistance Facility Agreement (FFA), there would indeed
be no practical need for an additional binding arrangement.
However, from a solidarity perspective, Greece, Portugal and maybe Ireland are
in principle perfectly eligible. Barring them from grant-based financial support,
and restricting them to loan-based solidarity (by the EFSM, EFSF, ESM) would
5. In the 2012 Semester, the Commission did not recommend that the EIP should be opened for any coun-
try. In the 2013 Semester, it suggested it may do so for Spain and Slovenia but only after assessing their
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bear a contradicting signal. The fact that, contrary to other potential recipients,
these countries have lost access to financial markets is not a valid argument to
restrict them to loans. To the contrary, the issues they are facing in their attempts
to tap financial markets on their own reveal their current unsustainable state
and their need of assistance.
Moreover, barring these small countries from additional grant-based support
would not make great differences in terms of the required resources. Spain and
Italy, which would allegedly become the main recipients of financial support,
would already take up the bulk of the financing needs (about 85%) irrespective
of the fund size.
4.5. Appropriate funding is required for the solidarity 
mechanism
The size of the funding cannot be as large as the one that would be involved in
bigger solidarity schemes. It would seem unrealistic to consider pooling large
sums at the European level for contractual arrangements, in particular if these
are mostly ‘ad hoc’ mechanisms, rather than a step towards a genuine ‘fiscal
capacity’ at the eurozone level.
However, if too limited, the common resources would seem inadequate to serve
both as an incentive to sign a contract and as sizable solidarity fund able to
cushion some of the costs of the competitive disinflation6. The maximum total
funding commitment by eurozone countries to be considered should be between
€30bn and €75bn. This would allow all the countries facing the greatest imbal-
ances to potentially benefit from yearly net transfers of respectively 0.2% and
0.5% of GDP for 5 years. Beyond the committed amounts, actual disbursement
would depend on the number and size of the countries engaging into a contrac-
tual arrangement. In the current political context, these figures may seem unre-
alistic or too ambitious. But no unnecessary political and legislative effort
should be spent on designing contracts whose insufficient funding would una-
voidably jeopardize their effectiveness.
At the press conference following the European Council of December 2012,
German Chancellor Merkel voiced an early opinion on the size of the funding,
when she mentioned that ‘[the solidarity fund would have] a very limited
budget, which would not lie in the hundreds of billions of dollars, but rather at
€10, 15 or 20 billions’ (Merkel, 2012). This range seems appropriate as a yearly
6. Considering the financial support as being essentially an incentive – albeit more limited than the one
suggested here –, Verhelst (2013) suggests an alternative to creating a dedicated budget for the contracts:
increasing the European co-financing of cohesion policy projects under the macroeconomic conditional-
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gross budget, much less so as the total capacity of the fund over several years. A
total capacity limited to €20bn would only amount to about 0.001% of the
combined Italian and Spanish GDP over 5 years, certainly too little to serve
either as an incentive or as a meaningful solidarity mechanism.
4.6. Contracting countries should benefit from ESM 
precautionary credit lines
The ECB’s pledge to do ‘whatever it takes to save the euro’, and subsequent
announcement of its ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ (OMT) programme
over the summer 2012, so far considerably eased pressure in sovereign bond
markets. However, as the ECB made its interventions conditional upon the
granting of an ESM precautionary credit line, it cannot intervene beyond the
positive effect this announcement had so far.
When signing a contract, non-programme countries should systematically be
granted a precautionary credit line from the ESM. The conditionality attached
to the ESM support would largely reflect the contractual arrangement content.
The Eurogroup would take its decision according to the ESM treaty in parallel
with the MIP procedure. The opening of an ESM credit line would in practice
allow for potentially unlimited intervention of the ECB in secondary sovereign
bond markets of the contracting country. Such a provision would definitely shel-
ter the beneficiary country from any risk of self-fulfilling liquidity crisis degen-
erating into a solvency crisis (De Grauwe, 2011).
If the solidarity linked to contracts can contribute to limit the risk of excessive
pressure in sovereign bond markets and the associated risks of contagion effects,
the activation of potential ESM and ECB interventions would constitute a much
stronger insurance policy. For the time of its reforms, the country would benefit
from the ECB acting as a genuine lender of last resort i.e. one which can act not
only on an unlimited basis, but also unconditionally. The ECB will independ-
ently decide at any point in time whether actual purchases in secondary markets
are required. Such activation would be particularly warranted for large coun-
tries such as Spain and Italy which are too big to be rescued due to the limited
capacity of the ESM (Vanden Bosch, 2012).
4.7. Legitimacy of the European Semester will not 
radically increase
The fact that contractual arrangements were put forward by the Council and the
Commission not only reflects concerns about the effectiveness, but also about
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non-binding recommendations for structural reforms (Hallerberg et al, 2012).
Reinforcing the currently limited legitimacy of the EU Semester could in turn
entice greater ‘national ownership’ and compliance with the CSRs. However, the
contracts as an ad hoc mechanism can help address some but not all of the EU
Semester legitimacy issues.
Greater involvement of the contracting countries’ National Parliament will nec-
essarily result from the binding nature of the contract. The draft contract should
in principle be backed by a parliamentary vote so that the government can ben-
efit from a clear mandate to engage in negotiations with EU institutions. A the
very least, National Parliament’s endorsement of reforms should be insured
prior to the Council decision to grant support. This could promote a greater
sense of legitimacy in so far as the government is willingly proposing the reforms
and signing a contract rather than feeling coerced into doing it. It could also be
envisaged for the Commission to directly address the National Parliament of the
contracting country to expose its position. However, in non contracting coun-
tries, National Parliament ownership of non-binding EU policy recommenda-
tions would still essentially depend on how national procedures have adapted to
the European semester.
At the EU level, contracts may offer the opportunity of a greater involvement of
the European Parliament. However, in so far as its prerogative would not be
extended beyond those foreseen by the ‘Economic dialogue’, the European Par-
liament would not increase the legitimacy of the decisions taken by the Council.
Currently, the European Parliament is limited to a right of information on eco-
nomic policies by the Treaty (under Art 121 (2) (5) TFEU). With no formal vote
that could alter or overrule any of the decisions taken, the European Parliament
will remain ‘restricted to creating public awareness of decisions and requesting
information on the decisions’ (Hallerberg et al, 2012). Extending the European
Parliament prerogatives would require a Treaty change which has not been
envisaged for the introduction of contracts. In the current set-up, it may none-
theless adopt (non-binding) resolutions regarding the Council’s major decisions
in the contract procedure in order to influence outcomes (adoption of the CSR,
adoption of the contract, etc).29
5. POSSIBLE CONTRACT PROCEDURE
This section briefly illustrates how, following the publication of the Country-
Specific Recommendation, the contract negotiation phase and the ensuing mon-
itoring phase could possibly occur. The exposed procedures largely rely on the
existing ones under the corrective arm of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Proce-
dure (MIP). This approach follows what the Commission suggested in its early
proposal. The exposed procedures also integrate the recommendations made in
the previous section.
Contract negotiation phase
Once a country submits a contract, it would follow a procedure similar to the
one following the submission of a Corrective Action Plan under the corrective
arm of the MIP, except that no sanctions would apply (as defined in art. 8 to 12
of regulation 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic
imbalances). Figure 1 illustrates how the ensuing negotiation steps would look
like.
Figure 1: Contract procedure similar to the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (art 8-12 of 
regulation 1176/2011)
Source: Own compilation.
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Following the Commission recommendation, the Council would adopt a CSR
(i) highlighting which recommendation the Member State should address in pri-
ority and suggesting reforms, (ii) indicating how much funding can be made
available and (iii) proposing a deadline. The addressed Member State would
propose a contract following a national debate, notably involving its National
Parliament. The Commission would have a maximum of two months to assess
whether the reforms proposed by the Member State are sufficient, and recom-
mend the Council to accept or request amendments accordingly. In the latter
case, the Member would as a rule have up to two months to adapt its initial
contract proposal. Once submitted to the Commission, it would be reassessed
following the same procedure. After the Council endorsed the contract, notably
by setting the detailed reform planning and the financial support made availa-
ble, the contract would be ‘validated’. Implementation of reforms by the Mem-
ber State would start and a first tranche of financial support released. In parallel,
monitoring by the Commission would ensure compliance.
Monitoring phase: withholding of financial support in case of 
non compliance
Figure 2 illustrates the main step of the monitoring phase that could lead to the
withholding of the financial support. It follows on the existing steps under the
Excessive Imbalance Procedure that can lead to sanctions (Art 10 regulation
1176/2011 and Art 3 regulation 1174/2011). The Member State regularly sub-
mits progress reports on the actions taken. Based on them, and possibly based
on on-site missions (‘enhanced surveillance’), the Commission publishes its
assessment report. Then, the Council assesses whether the Member State com-
plies with the contract. In case of non compliance, the Commission would adopt
a recommendation establishing non-compliance and setting a new deadline for
making corrections. The Council would be expected to endorse it, unless it
decides, by qualified majority, to reject the recommendation within 10 days (i.e.
reverse qualified majority would apply). The Member State would in turn be
required to act. Should non compliance be established once more, the next
financial support tranche would be withheld.MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
31
Figure 2: Withholding of financial support under the monitoring by the Commission
Source: Own compilation. 
Note: Follows similar steps than under (Art 10 reg. 1176/2011 and Art 3 reg. 1174/2011). RMQV –
Reverse Qualified Majority Voting.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, I essentially argued that contractual arrangements can make sense
if they are undertaken on a voluntary basis by most eligible countries – those
displaying the largest external adjustment needs – and that some sizable finan-
cial support is made available to them.
This last point – the necessity to associate money with commitment to struc-
tural reforms – will be a key point in the debate on these ‘contracts’. Contracts
will only be possible if eurozone countries agree to commit sufficient funding,
something of an unpalatable prospect in a period of fiscal consolidation. The
money will serve as an incentive for the country to voluntarily engage in a con-
tract, but is actually mostly justified on solidarity grounds. The targeted finan-
cial support will help cushion social and economic costs in countries adopting
the reforms that should facilitate the recovery of their cost and price competi-
tiveness. In the short to medium term, contracts would introduce net fiscal
transfers between eurozone Member States – an unprecedented form of solidar-
ity mechanism since the start of the eurozone crisis. The eurozone as a whole
would thereby share some of the adjustment burden of the countries most
affected by the crisis.
Although the discussions may convey signals on the degree of solidarity envis-
aged in the EMU in a longer-term perspective, discussions should stay focused
on what contracts can deliver in the short term. As such, contracts may be per-
fectly designed as temporary ad hoc mechanisms that only aim to facilitate the
correction of present imbalances of countries most afflicted by an exceptional
crisis. Financial support will imply only targeted, limited and temporary trans-
fers. It could possibly help address youth unemployment concerns. By defini-
tion, financial support will be made conditional upon structural reforms that
intend to speed up not slow down the adjustment process. Moral hazard argu-
ments that dominated previous debates on solidarity mechanisms will thus not
hold this time.
However, agreeing on such mechanisms will be difficult. Some political and fis-
cal resources trade-offs may also be at play. The most obvious one is related to
the banking union. Credit supply in several southern eurozone countries is
increasingly becoming a problem, and the ECB’s link between its policy rate and
borrowing in the real economy is broken. Restoring normal lending conditions
and reversing financial fragmentation in the eurozone for capital to flow ‘down-
hill’ again from creditor to debtor countries must remain a priority. This would
have a much larger impact than any form of fiscal transfers between countries.
An effective and genuine banking union is therefore needed. This would in par-
ticular require common fiscal resources as a backstop for the resolution mecha-MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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nism i.e. a form of solidarity potentially competing with the financial support
linked to contracts.
However, efforts on the banking union front should not undermine the rationale
for contracts. Although not a “game-changer” on their own, the contracts can
be very effective in supporting adjusting countries with targeted transfers. By
promoting the restoration of competiveness in the most vulnerable countries –
a precondition for cross-border financial flows to resume in Europe – contracts
complement the banking union initiative. They also share the longer-term objec-
tive of ‘smoothening the functioning of the EMU’. Finally, contracts may also
convey an important signal that countries sharing the euro are committed to
preserve their union, by increasing the scope of solidarity mechanisms within the
eurozone.35
ANNEX I
EU economic policy guidance on structural reforms – The European semester
and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
A. How binding are structural reforms recommendations issued by the EU?
The European Semester provides an integrated framework for reviewing fiscal
and macro-economic policies of EU Member States. Next to the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) pillar which focuses on fiscal policies, two pillars define EU
macroeconomic policy guidance: (i) the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
(MIP) and (ii) the EU2020 Integrated guidelines which merge the Broad Eco-
nomic Policy Guidelines and Employment Guidelines. The final output of the
European Semester are the Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs)
addressed to each Member State by the Council following a Commission pro-
posal (draft CSR). Next to the strictly ‘fiscal’ recommendation issued under the
SGP, a CSR thus includes several (about 5) recommendations concerning eco-
nomic policies and reforms. Contracts would concern the MIP-related recom-
mendations, i.e. those concerning the correction of economic imbalances, nota-
bly competitiveness imbalances.
Under the preventive arm of the MIP, these recommendations are essentially
non-binding, in so far that non-compliance does not lead to sanctions. They
concern structural reforms which Member States may or may not abide by. The
rationale for following them is enshrined in Art 121 TFEU, according to which
Member States should treat their ‘economic policies as a matter of common
concern’.
However, non-compliance may lead to the launch of the corrective arm of the
MIP, where recommendations become binding for euro area countries as failure
to obey leads to sanction (under regulation 1174/2011). The Excessive Imbal-
ances Procedure (EIP) can be opened, if following its In-Depth Review, the Com-
mission comes to the conclusion that a member State is affected by ‘excessive’
imbalances (Art 6.1 regulation 1176/2011). (Although in practice, the Commis-
sion waits for the country to state in its National Reform Programme how it
intends to address the issue). In this case, the Council can decide at a qualified
majority to require the country to take corrective action and submit a CAP. In
the first two EU semester exercises (2011 and 2012), the Excessive Deficit Pro-
cedure was not opened for any countries.
B. What are the main steps of EU economic policy guidance under the Euro-
pean Semester?
Figure 3 provides the major steps of the time-table that characterizes the Euro-
pean Semester (based on the 2012/2013 process).MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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Major policy orientations are prepared by the Commission in the Annual
Growth Survey (AGS) which is based on the EU2020 Integrated guidelines. Pub-
lished in November of the preceding year, this document sets a short list of pol-
icy priorities and a longer list of policy objectives for the EU as a whole, in terms
of economic, budgetary and labour policies and other reforms to boost growth
and employment. It is presented and simultaneously discussed in the Council of
Ministers and in the European Parliament in January-February. In March, the
Council of Ministers adopts these policy orientations which are subsequently
endorsed by the European Council.
In parallel, the MIP also starts in November with the publication of the Alert
Mechanism Report (AMR) by the Commission, which comprises a scoreboard
of indicators on macroeconomic imbalances. These allow for the identification
of the Member States warranting further analysis in In-Depth Reviews (IDRs).
These are published in spring (March-April) on the basis of which any imbal-
ances and their severity may be identified. If this qualitative analysis leads to the
conclusion that a Member State is experiencing ‘imbalances’, the Commission
Figure 3: EU semester and the MIP: main steps towards the adoption of Country-spe-
cific recommendations
Note: AGS: Annual Growth Survey; CSRs: Country-Specific Recommendations; SCP: Stability or Con-
vergence Programme; NRP: National Reform Programme; AMR: Alert Mechanism Report; IDRs: In-
Depth Reviews; EAR: Euro Area Recommendation; SWDs: Staff Working Documents (assessing the
NRP and SCPs); Source: own compilation.
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will propose for the Council to issue a (non-binding) recommendation (under
Art 121(2) TFEU). These are integrated in the (draft) Country Specific Recom-
mendations (CSRs), next to fiscal recommendations under the SGP. If instead
the Commission considers a Member State is affected by ‘excessive imbalances’,
it may recommend (under art 121(4) TFEU) the Council to adopt a recommen-
dation establishing the existence of an ‘excessive imbalance’ and thereby to open
the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP). The EIP – the corrective arm of the
MIP – requires the concerned country to submit a Corrective Action Plan (CAP).
If the corrective action taken is deemed insufficient, the Commission may rec-
ommend the Council to adopt sanctions (Art.3 of regulation 1174/2011).
In the mean time, taking into account the AGS, Member States jointly submit
their National Reform Programme (NRP) and their Stability or Convergence
Programmes (SCP) in April. Reforms and measures presented in these pro-
grammes take into account the AGS priorities but also typically refer to CSRs
issued in the EU Semester of the previous year. These are then assessed by the
Commission in Staff Working Documents (SWDs) which accompany the draft
Country Specific Recommendation for the Council. These are discussed in the
Council and the European Parliament. The European semester ends with the
endorsement of CSRs by the European Council and their formal adoption by the
Council of ministers.39
ANNEX II
Comparison of ‘Contractual Arrangement’ (Van Rompuy, 2012), and the 
‘Convergence and Competitiveness instrument’ (European Commission, 2012)
Contractual arrangement
Convergence and Competitiveness 
instrument
Contract
Coverage – Mandatory for all eurozone countries.
– Voluntary for non eurozone countries.
– Voluntary for countries under the pre-
ventive arm of the MIP.
– Mandatory for countries under the pre-
ventive arm of the MIP.
Build-up to 
contract 
In-depth reviews generalized to all EMU 
countries (based on thorough and on-
the-ground dialogue with each country)
– Earlier publication of Staff Working 
Documents assessing the NRP and CSP 
allowing for ‘informal dialogue on the analy-
sis’
– Coordination of major economic 
reforms: publication of an ‘horizontal 
appraisal of the proposed major economic 
reforms’ which would be discussed by 
Eurogroup and ECOFIN
Basis Country Specific Recommendations Country Specific Recommendations
– More detailed, policy-specific, and time bound 
– setting out specific policy measures and a 
timeframe for their implementation.
– CSRs focus on a small number of key 
elements related to weaknesses in the 
Member State concerned.
Initiative for 
proposing con-
tract
Not explicit: would arise from ‘dialogue’ 
between Commission and each country.
Member States submit the contractual 
arrangement proposal.
Contract con-
tent
Specific, detailed and measurable reform 
agenda. With concrete timelines and spe-
cific modalities for monitoring and 
access to information.
– Voluntary contract: Similar to Correc-
tive Action Plan under the corrective arm 
of the MIP.
– Mandatory contract: the CAP is the 
basis for the contract.
Negotiation 
phase
– Countries under the corrective arm: 
Articles 8 to 12 of Regulation 1176/2011 
apply.
– Countries under preventive arm: similar 
procedure and deadlines should apply, 
including monitoring and assessment but 
without possible sanctions.
Ownership/ 
Accountability
Commission to report to European Par-
liament and National government to 
report to National Parliament on 
progress achieved.
Not specified for the CCI as such 
(broader discussion in the Blueprint). 
Accountability to European Parliament in 
the context of the ‘Economic Dialogue’
Flexibility Significant economic change or altering 
political circumstances could lead to 
renegotiation.MONEY FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN THE EUROZONE: MAKING SENSE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
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Financial support
Legal basis Secondary legislation as part of the MIP 
based on art 136 TFEU or alternatively 
352 TFEU (if necessary with enhanced 
cooperation).
Link with con-
tractual 
arrangement
Optional Systematically coupled with/embedded 
in the contract.
Link with 
reforms
– Only for reform packages important for 
both the MS and the EMU.
– Lump sum not earmarked to specific 
reforms/overall allocation for financing 
measures flanking reforms (ex. Training 
programmes)
Instrument Special fund/financial instrument
Decision pursuant to Art 352 TFEU on 
expenditure being included in the EU 
Budget.
Resources ‘Specific resources’. Treated separately 
from the Multiannual Financial Frame-
work.
MS contribution based on contribution 
key dependent on GNI. Included in EU 
budget as assigned revenues (not under 
ceiling of MFF regulation)
Monitoring Commission to issue warning (use of 
121.4 TFEU) including call to correct 
deviation and timeline. Financing with-
held when call not met.
Contractual arrangement
Convergence and Competitiveness 
instrument41
ANNEX III
Size of financial support under two counter-cyclical mechanism proposals
Source: AMECO database, output gaps as provided in its fall 2012 forecast version, including forecasts
for 2012-2014.
Note: * calculated as 0.25% of output gap when above a 2% threshold (noted by “–” otherwise). ‘South-
ern country’ represents the average of the selected countries.
Source: Enderlein et al. (2012) based on AMECO database, output gaps as provided in its fall 2012 fore-
cast version, including forecasts for 2012-2014.
Note: * calculated as   where  ,  is the yearly transfer
reported in table, y denotes actual and y* denotes potential output and a denotes the share of the differ-
ence between individual and eurozone output gap to be offset. a is set at 0.5. ‘Southern country’ repre-
sents the average of the selected countries.
Table 2: Yearly transfers under Pisani-Ferry et al (2012) proposition* over 2009-2014 
for selected countries.
Year Greece Spain Italy Portugal
Southern 
country
2009 0.31% 1.03% 0.92% 0.69% 0.74%
2010 1.21% 1.17% 0.46% – 0.71%
2011 2.34% 1.01% – – 0.84%
2012 3.10% 1.13% 0.76% 0.89% 1.47%
2013 3.42% 1.13% 0.93% 1.07% 1.64%
2014 2.63% 0.60% 0.72% 0.78% 1.18%
Average 2.17% 1.01% 0.63% 0.57% 1.10%
Table 3: Yearly transfers as percentage of GDP under Enderlein et al (2012) proposition* 
over 2009-2014 for selected countries.
Year Greece Spain Italy Portugal
Southern 
country
2009 -0.97% 0.22% 0.15% -0.43% -0.26%
2010 1.96% 1.25% -0.15% -0.24% 0.71%
2011 4.08% 1% 0.15% 0.68% 1.48%
2012 4.52% 0.81% 0.41% 0.85% 1.65%
2013 4.81% 0.77% 0.23% 0.59% 1.60%
2014 3.43% 0.13% 0.22% 0.54% 1.08%
Average 2.97% 0.70% 0.17% 0.33% 1.04%
Ti a * yEZ yEZ
* – () yEZ
* yi yi
* – () yi
* ⁄ – ⁄ ()  * yi
* = Ti43
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